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Abstract. - In this paper, we present the first experimental demonstration on continuous variable
quantum key distribution using determinant Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen entangled states of optical
field. By means of the instantaneous measurements of the quantum fluctuations of optical modes
respectively distributed at sender and receiver, the random bits of secret key are obtained without
the need for signal modulation. The post-selection boundaries for the presented entanglement-
based scheme against both Gaussian collective and individual attacks are theoretically concluded.
The final secret key rates of 84 kbits/s and 3 kbits/s are completed under the collective attack for
the transmission efficiency of 80% and 40%, respectively.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two legitimate
parties, Alice and Bob, to establish the secret key only
known by themselves. A secret key is usually generated
by Alice transmitting the prepared quantum states to Bob,
who performs measurements on the received states to dis-
till the information. There are two types of QKD systems
in which the discrete or continuous quantum variables are
exploited, respectively. For discrete variable (DV) QKD
protocols the key information is encoded in discrete quan-
tum variables of single photon light pulse, such as po-
larization or phase [1]. In continuous variable (CV) QKD
protocols continuous quantum variables of light field, such
as amplitude and phase quadratures, are used for trans-
mitting information. Comparing with DV QKD of single
photon schemes CV QKD promises significantly higher
secret key rates and eliminates the need for single pho-
ton technology. Recently, coherent state CV QKD proto-
cols have been experimentally demonstrated [2–6]. These
successful experiments proved that CV QKD is a hope-
ful and viable path to develop quantum cryptography for
real-world applications. On the other hand the strictly
theoretical proofs on the security of CV QKD protocols
using both coherent and non-classical states of light have
been achieved [7–10]. CV QKD protocols have recently
been shown to be unconditionally secure, that is, secure
(a)E-mail: changde@sxu.edu.cn
against arbitrary attacks [11] and have been proved to be
unconditionally secure over long distance [12].
Quantum entanglement is one of the quite essential fea-
tures in quantum mechanics that has no analogue in clas-
sical physics. It has been theoretically demonstrated by
Curty et al. that the presence of detectable entanglement
in a quantum state effectively distributed between sender
(Alice) and receiver (Bob) is a necessary precondition for
successful key distillation [13]. However, there is no CV
QKD experiment directly utilizing optical entangled states
to be presented until now, although a variety of theoreti-
cal CV QKD protocols based on Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen
(EPR) entanglement and squeezing of optical fields have
been proposed [14–21]. Not like CV QKD protocols ap-
plying coherent states of light [2–6], in which the bits of
secret key are constructed classically using amplitude and
phase modulation, so-called prepare-and-measure (P&M)
scheme [5], in the entanglement-based (EB) schemes pro-
posed by refs. 16 and 17 the bits of the random secret
key are constructed by the instantaneous measurements
of the correlated quantum fluctuations of the quadratures
between two entangled optical modes distributed at Alice
and Bob. In the EB CV QKD protocols, the quantum fluc-
tuations of entangled optical beams with the truly quan-
tum randomness are utilized to generate the key. Due to
that the classical signal modulation is not needed, the bit
rates will not be limited by the rates of the electronic mod-
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ulators and the experimental systems will be simplified.
In the presented paper, we experimentally demon-
strated the proof-of-principle CV QKD protocol using a
pair of bright EPR entangled beams produced from a non-
degenerate optical parametric amplifier (NOPA). We con-
cluded the post-selection boundaries of the presented EB
CV QKD scheme against both Gaussian collective and in-
dividual attacks. By means of the post-selection, reconcili-
ation and privacy amplification techniques, the final secret
key was obtained through distilling the measured data of
the correlated quantum fluctuations of quadratures. The
generated raw key rate is 2 Mbits/s and the final secret key
rates are 84 kbits/s and 3 kbits/s against Gaussian collec-
tive attack for the transmission efficiency of 80% and 40%,
respectively. We believe that this is the first experimental
demonstration of CV QKD protocols directly exploiting
the EPR entanglement of amplitude and phase quadra-
tures of optical field. On the physical sense this exper-
iment intuitionally shows the close relationship between
the security of CV QKD and the quantum entanglement.
The experimental setup of the CV QKD protocol is
shown in fig. 1. The laser is a homemade continuous
wave intracavity frequency-doubled and frequency stabi-
lized Nd:YAP/KTP ring laser consisting of five mirrors
[22]. The second harmonic wave output at 540 nm is used
for the pump field of the NOPA and the fundamental wave
output at 1080 nm is separated into two parts, one is for
the injected signal of the NOPA and the other is used
as the local oscillation beams of the homodyne detections
for Alice and Bob. The NOPA consists of an α-cut type-
II KTP crystal and a concave mirror. Through a para-
metric down conversion process of type II phase match, a
pair of EPR beams with anticorrelated amplitude quadra-
tures and correlated phase quadratures may be produced
from the NOPA operating in the state of de-amplification,
that is, the pump field and the injected signal are out
of phase [23]. The bandwidth of the NOPA is about 20
MHz, in which the output beams are entangled. If dis-
tributing the two beams of EPR pair to Alice (beam a)
and Bob (beam b), the instantaneous measurement out-
comes of quadrature quantum fluctuations on their respec-
tive modes will be fairly identical due to the quantum cor-
relations of quadratures [24].
In the communication, Alice and Bob randomly measure
the amplitude or phase quadrature of the entangled opti-
cal beam they hold respectively, with the homodyne detec-
tion systems. After the measurement is completed, they
compare the measurement basis in the authorized classic
channel and only remain the measurement results of the
compatible basis. Then they use post-selection technique
to select a subset from the measured raw data to make the
mutual information of Alice and Bob advantage over Eve’s
information. To implement the post-selection, Alice pub-
licly announce the absolute values of the measured ampli-
tude or phase quadratures (|XA| or |YA|), but not publicly
open their symbols [4]. Alice and Bob also choose a ran-
dom subset of data to characterize the channel efficiency
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Fig. 1: The experimental system of QKD. NOPA: non-
degenerate optical parametric amplifier, ATT: attenuator,
PBS: polarization beam splitter, LO: local oscillation beam, N:
vacuum noise, PZT: piezoelectric transducer, BS: 50/50 beam
splitter, D1-D4: photodetector, BPF: band-pass filter.
and excess noise. From these values they select the secure
data and discard the insecure data. After post-selection
procedure, Alice and Bob interpret the post-selected data
into binary data. For the correlated phase quadratures
both Alice and Bob may define the positive and negative
phase fluctuations as a binary “1” and “0”, respectively.
However for the anticorrelated amplitude quadratures if
Alice define the positive (negative) amplitude fluctuation
as “1” (“0”), Bob should defines negative (positive) am-
plitude fluctuation as “1” (“0”). Then we apply the rec-
onciliation protocol to correct the errors of the retained
data. At last, we apply a privacy amplification procedure
to distill the final secret key.
In the security analysis we assume that the quantum
channel connecting Alice and Bob is lossy with imper-
fect transmittivity of η and the Gaussian excess noise δ
on the quadrature distribution exists in the communica-
tion system. The security analyses are restricted to pro-
tect against Gaussian attacks only. For the optimal beam
splitter attack [25], that is, Eve takes a fraction 1 − η of
the beam b at Alice’s site and sends the fraction η to Bob
through her own lossless line. In this case Eve is totally
undetected, and she gets the maximum possible informa-
tion according to the no-cloning theorem. For collective
attack, Eve listens to the communication between Alice
and Bob during the key distillation procedure and then
applies the optimal collective measurement on the ensem-
ble of stored ancilla. The maximum information Eve may
have access to is limited by the Holevo bound χ [5]. Un-
der the individual attack, Eve measures the intercepted
ensemble before the key distillation stage and Eve’s infor-
mation is summarized by the mutual information between
Alice and Eve, IAE , for direct reconciliation. Generally,
the information exchange is secure as long as the mutual
information between Alice and Bob (IAB) is larger than
Eve’s information. The condition of IAB > IAE for ex-
tracting secure key directly results in the restriction of
p-2
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the maximum transmission losses less than 3 dB which
will limit the possible transmission distances [25]. Fortu-
nately, the 3 dB loss limit for CV QKD protocols can be
beaten by implementing a reverse reconciliation scheme [2]
or applying an appropriate post-selection [3, 4, 26]. It has
been shown that there must be a lower limit of η (2η > δ)
for the secure key distillation if the excess noise exists
[27]. The security of EB scheme against collective attack
with reverse reconciliation has been proved [28]. Here, we
analyze the post-selection boundary for the EB scheme
against Gaussian collective attack and Gaussian individ-
ual attack.
For the EPR beams with anticorrelated amplitude
quadratures and correlated phase quadratures, we have
the following relations [28]:
〈X2
a(b)〉 = 〈Y 2a(b)〉 = V N0 = (e2r + e−2r)N0/2, (1)
〈(Xa +Xb)2〉 = 〈(Ya − Yb)2〉 = 2e−2rN0, (2)
〈XaXb〉 = −
√
V 2 − 1N0, (3)
〈YaYb〉 =
√
V 2 − 1N0, (4)
where r is the correlation parameter, N0 = 1/4 is the shot-
noise-limited variance. These beam are entangled, and the
measurement of a quadrature of beam a (e.g. Ya) gives
Alice information on the same quadrature of the other
beam (Yb). By measuring the amplitude quadrature Xa
(phase quadrature Ya) on her beam a, Alice learns XA
(YA), and projects the Bob’s beam b onto a X-squeezed
(Y -squeezed) state of squeezing parameter s = 1/V cen-
tered on (XA, 0) [(0, YA)] [28]. The best estimate Alice
can have on Yb knowing Ya is of the form YA = αYa with
α = 〈YbYa〉〈Y 2
a
〉 , the value of α being found by minimizing the
variance of the error operator δYA = Yb − YA. The con-
ditional variance VYb|YA of Yb knowing YA quantifies the
remaining uncertainty on Yb after the measurement of Ya
giving the estimate YA of Yb, and we have
VYb|YA = 〈δY 2A〉 = 〈Y 2b 〉 −
|〈YaYb〉|2
〈Y 2a 〉
=
N0
V
(5)
Since by measuring Ya Alice deduces YA, and since Yb =
YA+δYA, the beam b is projected onto a Y -squeezed state
with squeezing variance Vs = VYb|YA = N0/V centered
on (0, YA). Alternatively, by measuring Xa, Alice learns
XA and projects the other beam onto a X-squeezed state
centered on (XA, 0) with the same squeezing variance Vs =
N0/V . The variances of quadratures measured by Alice
and Bob are VA = α
2V N0 = (V − 1/V )N0 and VB =
(ηVA + ηVs + 1− η + δ)N0, respectively.
The probability that Bob obtains the measurement out-
come YB is given by
PB(Y |Ψ〉) = 1√
2piV N
B
exp[− (YB −
√
ηYA)
2
2V N
B
], (6)
where |Ψ〉 represents the transmitted quantum state, the
noise variance V N
B
= (ηVs+1−η+δ)N0 of which depends
on the squeezed variance ηVsN0, the ‘vacuum noise’ com-
ponent due to the line losses (1 − η)N0, and the ‘excess
noise’ component δN0. The corresponding Bob’s error rate
is given by
p =
PB(Y |Ψ〉)
PB(Y |Ψ〉) + PB(Y | −Ψ〉) = 1/[1+exp(
4
√
ηYA|YB|
2V N
B
)].
(7)
Based on eq. (7) we calculated the mutual information
between Alice and Bob
IAB = 1 + p log2 p+ (1− p) log2(1− p). (8)
For collective attack, Eve’s knowledge of the data can
be quantified by the Holevo bound χ, which equals to [29]
χ = S(ρ)−
1∑
i=0
piS(ρi), ρ =
1∑
i=0
piρi, (9)
where S(ρ) = −trρ log2 ρ is the von Neumann entropy of
a quantum state ρ. The χ includes that Eve being allowed
to measure out her ancillas collectively. After Alice and
Bob have corrected their bit stings, Eve can use the in-
formation transmitted over the public channel to optimize
her measurements on her ancilla systems. The quantum
states in Eve’s hand, conditioned on Alice’s data, are given
by |Ψi〉E = | ±
√
1− ηΨ〉, where i = 0, 1 denote the en-
coded binary state. These states are pure, so that we have
χ = S(ρ). What remains to be calculated are the eigen-
values of ρ = 12 (|Ψ0〉E 〈Ψ0|+ |Ψ1〉E 〈Ψ1|). The symmetry
allows us to write the states |Ψi〉E as
|Ψ0〉E = c0 |Φ0〉+ c1 |Φ1〉 (10)
|Ψ1〉E = c0 |Φ0〉 − c1 |Φ1〉
where the |Φi〉 are orthonormal states. A short calculation
shows that is already diagonal in this basis with eigenval-
ues |ci|2, so that the Holevo quantity is given by
χ = S(ρ) = −
1∑
i=0
|ci|2 log2 |ci|2. (11)
The normalization of ρ, |c0|2 + |c1|2 = 1, and the overlap
|c0|2 − |c1|2 =E 〈Ψ0 |Ψ1〉E give the expressions for the
coefficients,
|c0|2 = 1
2
(1 +E 〈Ψ0|Ψ1〉E), (12)
|c1|2 = 1
2
(1−E 〈Ψ0|Ψ1〉E).
The overlap of the two states can be calculated by
|E〈Ψ0|Ψ1〉E |2 = pi
∫
W (X,−Y )W (X,Y )dXdY if Y -
quadrature is measured, where W (X,Y ) is the Wigner
function of the projected squeezed states centered on
(X0, Y0). If Y-quadrature is measured by Alice, the cor-
relation matrix of the projected Y -squeezed state can be
written as
Vc =
1
4
[
V 0
0 1/V
]
. (13)
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Using the expression of Wigner function for Gaussian
states with one dimensional vector [30]
W (X,Y ) =
1
2pi
√
detVc
exp{−1
2
(X,Y )[Vc]
−1(X,Y )T },
(14)
we can write out the corresponding Wigner function of the
projected Y -squeezed state
W (X,Y ) =
2
pi
exp[−4(X −X0)
2
e2r + e−2r
− (e2r+ e−2r)(Y −Y0)2].
(15)
If Y -quadrature are measured, then Eve’s state is dis-
placed to Y0 =
√
1− ηYA, so the overlap between the two
states W (X,Y ) and W (X,−Y ) is
f =E 〈Ψ0|Ψ1〉E = exp[− (1− η)Y
2
A
2Vs
]. (16)
So, the Holevo quantity can be directly calculated. From
eqs. (8) and (11), we can obtain the secret key rates K =
IAB − χ against collective attack.
For the individual attack, the mutual information be-
tween Alice and Eve is expressed by [26]
IAE =
1
2
(1 +
√
1− f2) log2(1 +
√
1− f2) (17)
+
1
2
(1 −
√
1− f2) log2(1−
√
1− f2).
The secret key rate against individual attack is ∆I =
IAB − IAE . Of course, the security boundary can also be
directly applied to the anti-correlated amplitude quadra-
ture X, for that we only need to change the signs of the
measured amplitude values.
In the communication, at first Alice separates the EPR
entangled beams generated by the NOPA with a polarized
beam splitter (PBS) and then sends one of them (beam
b) to Bob while keeps the other one (beam a) within her
own station. The beam b is transmitted in air about 2 me-
ter. We simulated the QKD communication in two cases
respectively with the transmission efficiency of 80% and
40%, which were completed by inserting an appropriate
attenuator into the optical path. For making the balance
attenuation of two optical and implementing simultaneous
measurements of the correlated quantum fluctuations, we
insert an attenuator (ATT) with transmission efficiency
89% or 45% into the optical path of the EPR beams be-
fore they are separated. In addition to the detection ef-
ficiency of 90%, the total transmission efficiency between
Alice and Bob is 80% (89%× 90%) or 40% (45%× 90%),
respectively. During the communication, Alice and Bob
randomly and instantaneously measure the amplitude or
phase quadratures of their own beam with a homodyne de-
tection system, which is completed by randomly switching
the phase difference between the local oscillation and the
EPR beam from 0 for the amplitude quadratures to pi/2
for the phase quadratures. The time interval ∆t in which
Alice and Bob switch the quadrature measurement is 5 ms
Fig. 2: The “global” perspective of Alice’s and Bob’s data.
(a), Amplitude quadrature for 80% transmission efficiency.
(b), Phase quadrature for 40% transmmision efficiency. I:
post-selection boundary for collective attack. II: post-selection
boundary for individual attack. Green data points: data that
was error-free. Blue data points: data that has bit-flip errors.
Red data points: data that has a negative net information rate.
in our experiment. The long interval of 5 ms for switching
the measurement bases was limited by the phase locking
technology of the homodyne detection systems we held in
the proof-of-principle experiment. Indeed, to ensure the
security the time interval ∆t should be as short as possible
which should be only confined by the storage time of pho-
tons in the NOPA (It equals to the reciprocal of optical
cavity bandwidth. For our NOPA the minimal ∆tmin may
reach ∼ 5 × 10-8 s in principle.). Of course, we also can
enhance the security by lengthening the communication
period to be much longer than ∆t [31]. We choose the side-
band frequency of Ω = 2 MHz as the centre frequency for
Alice’s and Bob’s measurements because the highest en-
tanglement is obtained at this frequency with our system.
The measured initial correlation variances of the ampli-
tude sum and phase difference between the signal and idler
beams from the NOPA were 3.08 dB and 3.01 dB below
the corresponding shot-noise-level (SNL) at 2 MHz, which
p-4
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corresponding to the correlation parameter r = 0.355 and
r = 0.347 for amplitude and phase quadratures, respec-
tively. The output photocurrent from the negative power
combiner (-) passes through a low-noise amplifier of 30 dB
and a band-pass filter (BPF) with the central frequency of
2 MHz and the bandwidth of 600 kHz, then it is recorded
by a storage oscilloscope (Agilent 54830B) at Alice and
Bob, respectively. The recorded data are transferred to
a computer for the further data processing. Before the
communication, Alice and Bob should synchronize their
clocks and agree on the time interval ∆t and the instan-
taneous measurement time ∆T in which a data point is
taken. Only when the instantaneous measurement time
∆T is longer than the storage time of the NOPA, the mea-
sured correlations between the quadratures of signal and
idler beams have a stable value [32]. The sample rate of
10 MHz was chosen in the experiment. Since a band-pass
filter is placed before the storage oscilloscope in order to
extract the highly correlated quantum fluctuations, the
real communication bandwidth is reduced. Thus, in the
data processing we digitally re-sample the recorded data
at 2 MHz (which corresponds to ∆T = 5× 10-7 s).
After having recorded a string of data which include
many data sets (each set is measured within a phase
switching time interval of 5 ms), Alice and Bob commu-
nicate through an authenticated public channel to discard
the sets measured on the incompatible bases and to re-
main the compatible measured sets corresponding to the
same bases. The measured normalized variances of Alice’s
and Bob’s amplitude quadratures are 6.78N0 and 7.02N0
for 80% transmission efficiency, respectively. Considering
the influence of transmission efficiency, the variance mea-
sured by Alice is V
A
′ = (ηVA + 1 − η)N0 = 6.78N0 for
the transmission efficiency 80%, so we have VA = 8.23N0.
Since VA = (V − 1/V )N0 and Vs = N0/V , we ob-
tained V = 8.35N0 and Vs = 0.12N0. From VB =
(ηVA+ηVs+1−η+δ)N0 and Bob’s variance value we ob-
tained the corresponding excess noise of δ1 = 0.14N0 for
80% transmission efficiency. In the same way, from the
normalized variances of Alice’s and Bob’s phase quadra-
tures 3.89N0 and 4.05N0 for 40% transmission efficiency,
we calculated the excess noise of δ2 = 0.11N0. Fig. 2
shows the “global” perspective of Alice’s and Bob’s re-
sults measured on compatible bases, fig. 2 (a) shows the
function of the amplitude quadratures (XB vs XA) for
80% transmission efficiency and fig. 2 (b) shows that of
the phase quadratures (YB vs YA) corresponding to 40%
transmission efficiency. The anti-correlation of the ampli-
tude quadratures (±Xa ∼ ∓Xb) and the correlation of the
phase quadratures (±Ya ∼ ±Yb) are clearly exhibited in
the perspective. The quadrature measurements are nor-
malized to the SNL of the measured beam. Each one of
fig. 2 (a) and (b) contains 50,000 data points.
For extracting the secure data of IAB > χ ( IAB > IAE)
from the measured raw data in the CV QKD, we used a
post-selection technique, that is, to select a subset from
the measured raw data points to make the mutual infor-
mation of Alice and Bob advantage over Eve’s informa-
tion. According to the way described before, Alice and
Bob select the secure data and discard the insecure data.
The dashed hyperbolas I and II in fig. 2 correspond to
the secure boundaries for collective attack and individual
attack, respectively. The regions at the outside of the hy-
perbolas I (II) are secureK > 0 (∆I > 0) for the collective
(individual) attack, while the regions between the hyper-
bolas are insecure (red points), the data in which should
be discarded. The green data points correspond to error-
free bits, whilst the blue data points correspond to that
with bit-flip errors.
After post-selection procedure, Alice and Bob interpret
the post-selected data into binary data according to the
way described above. Then we apply the “Cascade” recon-
ciliation protocol [33] to correct the errors of the retained
data. At the stage of the error correction, the data are ar-
ranged into many random subsets and the error data are
corrected. The efficiency of reconciliation is about 80%.
At last, we apply a privacy amplification procedure based
on universal hashing functions to distill the final secret
key [34, 35]. First, Alice and Bob calculate a conservative
upper bound for Eve’s knowledge about their key, then
Alice and Bob compute the parities of random subsets
of the error-corrected key bits. The obtained parity bits
are kept as the final secret key. The results for different
stages of the QKD protocol used to distill the secret key
are shown in Table 1. The cost of these secret key dis-
tillation processes is a reduction in the size of the secret
key. With the existence of the Gaussian collective attack,
after the privacy amplification procedure the final secret
key rates of 84 kbits/s and 3 kbits/s are obtained for the
transmission efficiencies of 80% and 40%, respectively. To
the Gaussian individual attack only, the final secret key
rates of 109 kbits/s and 10 kbits/s are obtained for the
transmission efficiencies of 80% and 40%, respectively.
In conclusion, we accomplished the first experimental
demonstration of CV QKD protocol using the bright EPR
entangled optical beams. The quantum entanglement be-
tween two beams and the random quantum fluctuations
of amplitude and phase quadratures of respective optical
mode provide the physical mechanism for the CV QKD
protocol without the signal modulation. The security of
the EB CV QKD protocol against Gaussian collective and
individual attack using post-selection technique is ana-
lyzed. Although, as an example, the binary coding scheme
is utilized for simplification, Alice and Bob can agree on a
higher dimensional coding by dividing their results into in-
tervals corresponding to more than two bits values, in prin-
ciple. The presented CV QKD experiment intuitionally
and directly demonstrated the importance of the quantum
entanglement for the secure communication. It is possible
to develop the more complicated CV QKD networks by
using the multipartite CV optical entangled states based
on this demonstrated scheme.
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Table 1: Experimental results for the different stages of the QKD protocol used to distill the final secret key. Each step
shows Alice and Bob’s mutual information (IAB bits/symbol), Eve’s information (χ bits/symbol for collective attack and IAE
bits/symbol for individual attack), the corresponding net information rate (K bits/symbol and ∆I bits/symbol) and the secret
key rate (kbits/second) for 80% and 40% transmission efficiency, respectively.
80% Transmission Efficiency
Collective Attack Individual Attack
IAB χ K Rate IAB IAE ∆I Rate
Raw Data 0.36 0.35 0.01 2000 0.38 0.23 0.15 2000
Post-selection 0.64 0.44 0.20 508 0.52 0.26 0.26 679
Reconciliation ∼ 1 0.68 0.32 346 ∼ 1 0.51 0.49 436
Privacy Amplification ∼ 1 ∼ 0 ∼ 1 84 ∼ 1 ∼ 0 ∼ 1 109
40% Transmission Efficiency
Collective Attack Individual Attack
IAB χ K Rate IAB IAE ∆I Rate
Raw Data 0.18 0.44 -0.26 2000 0.18 0.33 -0.15 2000
Post-selection 0.69 0.63 0.06 46 0.44 0.35 0.09 180
Reconciliation ∼ 1 0.89 0.11 34 ∼ 1 0.80 0.20 115
Privacy Amplification ∼ 1 ∼ 0 ∼ 1 3 ∼ 1 ∼ 0 ∼ 1 10
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